Reading Martin Wight's claim that "one of the supreme books on power politics is the history by Thucydides of the great war between Athens and Sparta, commonly called the Peloponnesian War" 3 recalls the message of my own teacher during the Cold War. Doubtless for him World War II was the most obvious analogue. Certainly Thucydides' search for "an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it" rings true to Realists seeking timeless truths, or even mathematical laws, about human nature's ruthless search for dominance (1.23). Jaeger's quote at the beginning of this paper probably conveyed the same Realist message to many members of the German speaking world of the 1930s, even though it was part of a more general treatment of Greek civic culture.
Beyond the Realist preoccupation with the motivational bases of human nature and power politics, Thucydides' work is perhaps most known for the total moral cynicism of the Athenian statement in the Melian conference that "right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (V.89).
Surely this quotation continues to dazzle, shock and subdue students in introductory courses on International Politics around the world.
Would not any positivistic social scientist also want to claim to "have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time" (1.23)? I would indeed be surprised if "quantitative/scientific" international politics falsificationists have not approvingly cited Thucydides' search for "the clearest data," or his standard of objective precision: "the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible" (ibid.).
-2-Timeless laws of power politics, independent of moral praise or blame, objectively and falsifiably delineated with what Jaeger takes to be mathematical precision --surely these were the goals of Thucydides' "scientific history" or "scientific politics." And just as surely they serve as reasons why Morganthau inspired Realists as well as neopositivist behavioralists could agree on their own contemporary interpretations of the insights of a great classical writer.
These views I take to be those of the majority of contemporary students of international relations; they were my own until a few years ago when I began regularly to assign Thucydides' great work in a historically oriented class on theories of international relations.
Although I still agree that Thucydides is one of the first "scientific historians" in the Western tradition, 4 I now think his conception of "scientific history" to have been a dialectical view rather characteristic of philosophically serious students of the sophists, not the logical positivism or amoral Realism in terms of which so many of us have been trained to see the past, nor the ambassadorial sophistry to which some of us still aspire. 5 And it seems equally clear that his historiography combines a commitment to factual accuracy with what we would now call a dramaturgical perspective on human affairs. Thus, like other Greek thinkers, Thucydides sought nonpositivistically to derive practical, moral "lessons" from his historical analysis. These were grounded in an eternal, dialectical grammar of natural human possibilities.
To better understand the relevance of Thucydides' insights and historiography for today's problems, I want to focus on the dialectical ways in which he presents the Melian dialogue. For it turns out that Thucydides -3-consciously used a formalizable sophistic dialectic in the writing of this dialogue. 6 Additionally, Thucydides' dialectic has both a dramatic and an ontologial aspect. Thus Thucydides uses the dialogue in a way that heightens the dramatic impact of his tale, and the lessons we are to derive from it.
Finally, I want to suggest that Thucydides was consciously a participant in ongoing debates within the Greece of his time about the proper conduct of international affairs, debates which find many echoes in contemporary paradigm conflicts between Marxists, Realists, traditionalists, peace researchers, feminists and behavioralists. Through a critical appreciation of Thucydides' arguments, we may gain insights pointing toward new conclusions in our own debates.
I The Melian Dialogue as Formalizable Dialectics

A. Three levels of argument in the Melian Conference
There are three levels to the discussion in the Melian Conference (V. 85-116). The first level of discussion concerns the type of negotiation to take place --whether it will be a logical and analytical investigation of the sort we would call deductive science, merely a rhetorical exchange before a large group of people, or a formal disputation allowing interruptions at any point, i.e., a serious debate. My analysis is that the third opinion prevails: there is a jointly recognized form of serious diplomatic argument paralleling the notions of formal disputation evolved by pre-Socratic philosophers as well as in the early Greek law courts, where sophists were often hired to plead one or the other side of an important case.
A second level of discussion concerns the subject of the Athenian-Melian debate, what they are going to argue about.
In this context appears the -4-famous quote about the strong doing what they will and the weak suffering what they must. It is part of an argument about the standards to be appealed to in the debate, as well as the genuineness of Athenian participation. The conclusion of this exchange, on which there is not total agreement, is that at least tactically both parties will argue in terms of each other's interests.
Once the terms of the debate and the subject of the debate have been settled upon, after earlier agreement on what the form of the debate is going to be, we come to the Melian dialogue proper. This third level of discussion proceeds as a structure disputation, formal dialectics. I wish to illustrate how the rules followed in the dialogue proper conform to a formalized procedural theory of dialectics offered more than 2,000 years later in a book As evidence for my characterization of the character and context of the Melian dialogue, I quote Thucydides' Athenians: "Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would pass without refutation," they propose a "method more cautious still": "make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that before going on any further" (V.86). Table I , extracted from the early part of his book, presents his major symbolisms, along with some of the associated rules of their use.
In going through the symbolisms in the Table, it should be emphasized that they are not identical with somewhat similar terms in the conventional sentential and predicate calculi. Thus "&" as a connective sometimes involves a more substantial combinatorial rewriting than the modern "logical and,"
while the provisoed inference indicated by "/" is not as strong as the "s"
and '" used by modern formalists. Neither is the "ceteris paribus"
interpretation of "P generally follows from Q, P/Q" certainly restateable using parametric probability distributions, which the Greeks did not understand. /See note 8./
On the other hand, the logic of assertion and counter-assertion, as schematically rendered by Rescher, includes the possibility of purely logical deduction, PQ, without being limited to it. (This is made clear in his use of such 'pure,' modern, formal deductions within provisoed denials). 9 The asymmetry of options allowed proponents and opponents clearly also distinguishes Rescher's schematicization from modern sentential calculus.
In a sense, one could call Rescher's formalism a "dia-logic," to use a term I first saw in Jurgen Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests. 10 Thus the logic highlights dialogue-like, contradictory interchange possibilities and limitations, it allows updated empirical referents, it distinguishes direct from partial and tacit disagreements, and it has a kind of nonprogressive sequence: ! P, t 'b P, !P.
(c) Countermoes to provisoed assertion or denial A provisoed assertion P/Q can only be maintained in the context of a nonprovisoed assertion of Q, Beyond attacking these assertions us i n g the aforementioned responses, the following further responses may be offered in reply against P/Q as such:
NOTE (i):
Again, this move is available only to the opponent.
NOTE (2):
In the special case of R = Q this move comes to -P/Q & tQ. But this cannot be, given our convention that grounding moves of the form XIY are always "correct," -P/Q cannot arise in the face of P/Q. Hence R must represent some genuine qualification to Q, so that the move from Q to Q & R constitutes an advance in the discussion. 
D. A Partial Formalization of the Melian Dialogue
We now shift to the statements of the debate, framed at least initially in terms of each other's interests. The Athenians argue: "We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country;
as we would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both." This is the main double-barreled thesis.
Moreover, their force of arms places the Athenians in the position of the proponent. Our formalization of this argument is given in the first row of Table 2 .
In order better to catch the refutation efforts by the Melians, in Table 2 the categorical assertion of the Athenian interest is broken up into a compount categorical assertion, ! (P 1 & P 2 ). An argument sketch (line 2) links Melian submission to their own and Athenian interests.
As any member of an oral thesis evaluation committee knows, thesis critics do not have to propose and defend alternative positive propositions or categorical assertions."l Rescher argues there is a different type ofargument appropriate for trying to discredit a thesis, either a cautious or a provisoed denial (see Table 1 ).
The Melians counter argument, line 3 of Table 2 , is indeed deferential and modest, appropriate to the circumstances.
They cautiously beg to differ: "And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as /it is/ for you to rule?" Symbolically, this is represented -12-by y ( P 1 "p 2 ) . The Athenians' reply would be described by Rescher as a provisoed counterassertion to the Melians' cautious denial (challenge):
avoid "suffering the worst"; likewise the Athenians would gain a more valuable tributary "by not destroying" the Melians.
Rescher uses "dialectics" to denote the process of disciplined engagement in disputational inquiry (p.x). The discipline, "dialectic," whose rules we have been illustrating, "is to our factual knowledge what logic is to our formal knowledge: a mechanism of rational validation. Because its key inferential relation, provisoed assertion ("/") is only presumptive, it does not unconditionally support detachment of a conclusion q from p & (po q).
Hence "in dialectical (as opposed to deductive) reasoning an assessment of the cognitive standing of a thesis never leaves its probative origins behind altogether" (p. 8). Thus dialectical reasoning in Rescher specific sense meshes nicely with ordinary, non-apodictic historical inference.
Dialectical arguments can thus go back and choose further to examine and even attempt to redefine the grounds for provisoed inferences. This is exactly what the Melians do, questioning the asserted link between Athenian imperial interest (Q) and P 1 , the original Athenian assertion that Melian submission would be in Athens' interest. The attempt to redefine Athenian interests is a move Rescher calls "weak distinction." "Distinction," he argues, "is the most characteristic and the most creative of dialectical moves" (p. 12).12 Specifically, they try to argue in favor of being "neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side." In line 5, Table 2 , a "&" is used to emphasize that the attempted, cautious -redefinition of the Athenian imperial interest means a more thorough rewriting of Q than an ordinary, purely logical conjunction would imply.
-13-Unfortuntely for the Melians, the Athenian response, one of the provisoed countermoves against a weak distinction noted on Table 1 , points deeper into Athenian imperial motivation: even Joseph Stalin might cringe to say "your hostility cannot hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power." Our multiple translations of this compound counterassertion in line 6 ot Table 2 fit at least in part Rescher's rules in Section iv (d) of Table 1 ; they also provide a case where purely deductive sentential inferences among variant expressions and arguments might be presumed.
D. Implications and Issues
The clear, precise fit of Rescher's possibility rules of formal disputation with Thucydides' text written nearly 2400 years earlier deserves further reflection. On the positive side, this non trivial instantiation of an epistemological orientation should help renew and clarify a classical Western perspective that we do not, even in the contemporary legal profession, readily identity as dialectical. That this factually oriented, practical discipline appears to subsume, without being reducible to, ordinary deductive sentential logic, makes it more interesting for historically oriented analysts than they might previously had thought.12
In Chapter 4 of his book, Rescher demonstrates how dialectical logic can By contrast we must also remember Pericles' exalted defense of Athenian ideals in his funeral oration, coupled with his advocacy of a patient, defensive war strategy. It has escaped no careful reader that the Melian butchery is followed immediately by a new book (VI) beginning Thucydides' dramatic account of Athens' fateful, self-defeating effort to conquer all of Sicily. Given his evolving understanding of the significance of various events, and even the likelihood that many of the speeches were written or rewritten after the narrative was nearly finished,1 7 it is highly plausible to look for Thucydides' own interpretations and analysis of events and their motives in the contents and oppositions apparent in his speeches.18
Just such a series of contrasts, noted by many commentators, is the difference between Pericles, Diodotus, Nicias, Cleon and Alcibiades (described Another, even more momentous contrast implicit in Thucydides' speech texts contrasts Pericles and Nicias with Alcibiades, the principal instigator of the fateful Sicilian invasion (and that of Melos). 20 Nicias argued against "risking things present for the sake of things future and uncertain," against the "madness of attacking a land which, if they prevail, they cannot hold,"
and against falling "sick of a fatal passion for what is beyond your reach"
(VI. 1-13).21 Alcibiades, on the other hand, not long after having helped undermine Nicias' interim peace with Sparta by a spiteful trick (V.44), boasts that his "folly" (or "madness") brought benefits in alliances against Sparta, and asserts that the Sicilian cities are unpatriotic, inhabited by "motley rabbles." He defends his extravagent sending of a record seven chariots to -18-the Olympic games, scorns Nicias' 'do-nothing policy,' calls for supporting their allies on Sicily, suggests that the initiation of a second front will "humble the pride of the Peloponnesians," and concludes that "a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin" than inaction: "the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can" (VI, 17-20). The interest of the multitude in the allies' exaggerated reports of great wealth in Sicilian temples and treasuries help him carry the day.
How Alcibiades' remarks contrast with Pericles' speech at the beginning of the war! Like Nicias much later, he was "more afraid of /Athens'/ own blunders than of the enemy's devices," possessing many "reasons to hope for a favorable issue, if /the citizens/ can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of the war." (I, 143).
On this contrast, which
gives an ironic cast to Alcibiades' later remarks, Thucydides himself makes an explicit judgement, not in a speech, but in comments that constitute his encomium for Pericles at his death, two and a half years after the war began. Strauss puts some of the above oppositions into a partial hierarchy of dialectical distinctions:
Just as humanity divides itself into Greeks and barbarians, Greekness in its turn has two poles, Sparta and Athens. The fundamental opposition of motion and rest returns on the level of Greekness; Sparta cherishes rest whereas Athens cherished motion. game theorists, causal modelers, FORTRAN simulators, or optimal controllers likely to take my beginning quote from Jaeger as self-legitimating.) 25 If the opposed generative principles of Greekness and barbarism, war (motion) and peace (rest), etc., delimit human possibilities, they also show why history contains both novelty and a tendency to repeat itself. It should be clear that Thucydides the Athenian, proud of Pericles' "school of Hellas," but equally sensitive to and appreciative of Spartan "moderation," certainly preferred "Greek" to "barbarian" conduct. Both a Hobbesian state of nature Fire is the basic element.... All things came-to-be by conflict between opposites... The All is limited, ... alternatively born from fire and dissolved into fire... That phase of the cycle which involves a coming-to-be of things is called war and strife, while that which involves destruction by fire is called concord and peace. 2 7 Almost contemporaneously with Thucydides, the Pythogoreans linked the One and the many in terms of oppositions between the limited and the unlimited, rest and motion, good versus evil, odd vs. even, unity vs. plurality. 28 I would suggest that Thucydides' avoidance of the term for "essence," does not mean he avoids appeals to nature, to arguments about necessity, character -24-and compulsion concerning the causes of the war. Although Thucydides' rationalism and his sophistical skepticism argue against attributing to him precise or unchanging ontological doctrines, these substantial roots of his mode of analysis in the "metaphysics" of his period is too strong to ignore. ... Galileo speaks of experimental testing as an 'ordeal.' Stated broadly, the dialectical (agonistic) approach to knowledge is through the act of assertion, whereby one suffers or calls forth as counter-assertions the kind of knowledge that is the reciprocal of his act. This is the process embodied in tragedy, where the agent's action involves a corresponding passion, and from the sufferance of the passion /by the original agent or the empathetic observer/ there arises an understanding of the act, an understanding that transcends the act. In this final state of tragic vision, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are merged... /A/lthough purely circumstantial factors participate.. .they bring about a representative kind of accident.. .that belongs with the agent's particular kind of character. (Burke, p. 38).
How does this dramatic conception of tragedy apply to Thucydides' work in general, and the Melian dialogue in particular? Several strands of argument point in the same direction. 
III An Epilogue on the Appropriation of Historical Classics
Somehow an epilogue, rather than a conclusion, seems appropriate at this point. The major theses of this paper now having been stated and argued, it is perhaps appropriate to reflect more generally on how different traditions of research try to appropriate classical writers and events for their own ends. New Brunswick, 1975 , translates this passage using the mere dialectical metaphor of a quarrel, and his characteristic concern with fear: "And the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power; which putting the Lacedaemonians into fear necessitated the war." Unless otherwise noted, I shall cite the Crowley translation in my text.
2. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, p. 39f. Quite apposite to Jaeger's quote is Burke's claim that "We can.. .catch glimpses of a relation between dialectics and /Platonic/ mathematics...in the fact that mathemata means both things learned...and the mathematical sciences...." Burke opposes a pathema (passive condition or suffering) to a poiema (an action, deed, poem) and restates the classic proverb "poiemata, pathemata, mathemata, suggesting that the act organizes the opposition (brings us to the fore whatever factors resist or modify the act), that the agent thus 'suffers' this opposition, and as he leaves to take the oppositional motives into account, widening his terminology accordingly, he has arrived at a higher order of understanding." (ibid.) This perspective I take to be a deeper vision of the potentialities of mathematical political history than that suggested by Jaeger's quote. 4. Jaeger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 483, argues Hecataeus was the first Greek taking "the scientific and rational approach to the facts of human life as the essence of history," while Herodotus' gets the credit for introducing "the religious and dramatic element" into history.
5.
The phrase 'scientific historian" appears in many commentaries including Jaeger's and Leo Strauss, "On Thucydides' War of the Peloponnians and the Athenians," pp. 139-242 of his The City and Man, The University of
